Double-counting in Sentencing: Ng Kuan Chuan v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 5

Introduction

1.                In Ng Kuan Chuan and another v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2026] SGHC 5, the appellants, Leong Koon Wah (“Leong”) and Ng Kuan Chuan (“Ng”), were involved in a fraudulent investment scheme which they marketed as generating returns from foreign exchange trades conducted by professional traders and matched with liquidity providers. Investors were led to believe that profits and losses arose from genuine market trades.

2.                 The Court found that the scheme was in fact a sham: there were no professional traders or liquidity providers, and payouts to earlier investors were funded using monies from later investors, amounting to a classic Ponzi scheme.

3.                 The appellants operated the scheme through corporate vehicles and promoted it using a multi-level marketing structure with incentives for recruitment.

4.                 As a result, they were charged under s 340 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”) for fraudulent incorporation (the “Fraudulent Trading Charge”), s 82 of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) for carrying on unlicensed leveraged forex trading (the “SFA Charges”), and s 3 of the Multi-Level Marketing and Pyramid Selling (Prohibition) Act (Cap 190, 2000 Rev Ed) (the “MLMA Charge”).

5.                 At first instance, both appellants were convicted after trial (with Leong pleading guilty to the MLMA charge at the end). Ng received an aggregate sentence of 7.5 years’ imprisonment and a $300,000 fine (in default 6 months’ imprisonment), and Leong received 10.5 years’ imprisonment and a $3,658,600 fine (in default 18 months’ imprisonment).

6.                 On appeal, Ng challenged both conviction and sentence, while Leong appealed only his sentences.

7.                 The High Court dismissed the appeal against conviction but partially allowed the appeals against sentence, reducing the sentences for the Fraudulent Trading Charge (Ng’s from 6.5 years to 4.5 years, and Leong’s from 6.5 years to 4 years). The High Court allowed this portion of the appeal by considering relevant precedents.

Issues of sentencing

8.                 One of the issues that arose in the appeal was whether there has been double-counting by the District Court in arriving at the individual sentences.

9.                 In particular, in support of the appeal against the sentence for the MLMA Charge, Leong argued that the District Court had double counted the aggravating factors which was already taken into account in the calibration of the Fraudulent Trading Charge. These factors included the number of investors, the revenue generated, the sophistication of the scheme and the personal benefits reaped (see [53]). According to Leong, the sentencing judge should take account of those aggravating factors for only one of the offences because taking them into account for both results in double counting (see [54]).

10.            The High Court dismissed this argument. The High Court explained that the mischief targeted by s 340 of the Companies Act differs from that under s 3 of the MLMA. The aggravating factors highlighted, whilst similar in nature, operated to exacerbate each offence differently in a manner that spoke specifically to the mischief targeted by each offence (see [55]).

11.            Even if the aggravating factors relied on by the different charges are identical, they are still relevant for the calibration of sentence for each charge. If there are concerns that this would result in an overly harsh aggregate sentence, this could be dealt with at the end of the sentencing process when the court deals with the principle of totality (see [56]).

Observation

12.            The High Court’s discussion of double counting in sentencing serves as a timely reminder on the steps involved in calibrating the appropriate sentence in cases involving more than one charge.

13.            Where an accused faces more than one charge, the calibration of sentence involves two steps:

a.     First, the calibration of the sentence for each individual charge; and

b.    Second, the calibration of the aggregate sentence by determining which sentence should run consecutively and which concurrently by taking into consideration the principle of totality.

14.            Under the first step, the sentencing court determines the sentence of the individual charge separately. The sentencing judge will generally consider all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors that bear upon each discrete sentence (see Mohammed Shouffee bin Adam v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 998 at [26], Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] 5 SLR 799 at [98(a)], and ADF v PP [2010] 1 SLR 874 at [92]).

15.            As such, it will not be considered double counting if the same or similar facts are relied upon in the calibration of the sentence for each discrete charge. This is provided that they are each relevant aggravating or mitigating factor in the calibration of sentence for that particular charge.

16.            It is only in the second stage that the sentencing judge must take care not to double count factors already taken into consideration in the determination of the sentence for each discrete charge (see Mohammed Shouffee bin Adam v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 998 at [78] and ADF v PP [2010] 1 SLR 874 at [92]).

17.            In the present case, Leong’s argument that the sentencing judge should take account of similar aggravating factors for only one of the offences and not take those factors into consideration for the other offences would lead to an artificiality in sentencing for the other offences. As the High Court highlighted, such an approach would alter the very character of the offending act as disclosed on the facts. If there are concerns that the aggregate sentence would be crushing, that should be dealt with at the second stage of the sentencing process, where the totality principle is considered.

Conclusion

18.            The High Court’s decision in this case provides a clear reminder that, in sentencing, the concept of “double counting” must be approached with care and doctrinal clarity. Even where similar aggravating factors arise across multiple charges — such as the scale of harm, sophistication of the scheme, or personal gain — these factors may legitimately be considered in calibrating the sentence for each individual offence, so long as they are relevant to the distinct mischief targeted by each statutory provision.

19.            In this case, the offences under s 340 of the Companies Act and s 3 of the MLMA addressed different harms, and the same factual elements could therefore aggravate each offence in different ways. To exclude such factors from consideration in one charge would risk distorting the true nature and seriousness of the offending conduct.

20.            The key safeguard against an unduly harsh outcome lies not at the stage of determining individual sentences, but at the subsequent stage where the court applies the totality principle. The sentencing process must remain structured and sequential: first, by assessing each charge on its own terms with all relevant factors, and second, by ensuring that the overall aggregate sentence is proportionate and not crushing.

21.            Concerns about overlap or excessive punishment should therefore be addressed in calibrating how sentences run (whether consecutively or concurrently), rather than by artificially limiting the factors considered at the individual charge stage.